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ANALYSIS OF RECENT ILLINOIS SUPREME
COURT CRIMINAL LAW DECISIONS
John Powers Crowley* and Gerald M. Werksman* *
In this Article, the authors survey the recent criminal law decisions of
the Supreme Court of Illinois. While emphasizing the decisions focusing
on the procedural aspects of criminal trials, the Article also discusses in-
teresting cases dealing with the scope of discovery allowed a defendant,
prejudicial closing arguments, sentencing, and the defense attorney's role in
a fair proceeding. The authors conclude with a discussion of the court's
decisions dealing with substantive criminal law. Of those included, one
focuses on the constitutionality of the Illinois reckless homicide statute,
while the other two analyze and interpret the bribery sections of the Crim-
inal Code.
N surveying the criminal law cases decided by the Illinois Su-
preme Court' during the past year, it would be a disservice to
both the court and the reader to structure the discussion around
an artificially unifying theme. There is, of course, no reason to ex-
pect a unifying theme when the cases accepted for review by Illinois'
highest court generally represent a wide range of procedural issues
which recognize no substantive limitations.
As expected, the court considered adherence to procedure as a
means of insuring fundamental fairness in the criminal justice sys-
tem. The acceptability of the procedure depended upon both
precedent and the evaluation of prejudicial effects. When the court
entered the forest of substantive law, the results produced were less
than inspiring.2
•Partner, Crowley, Burke, Nash & Shea, Chicago, Illinois.
* * Mr. Werksman, a member of the Illinois Bar, is presently engaged in private
practice in Chicago, Illinois.
1. This Article is devoted to a survey of Illinois law. For a review of United
States Supreme Court decisions see The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1974). For a review of Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decisions
see Dienes, Criminal Law and Procedure, Review of the Law of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 50 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 285 (1973).
2. See People v. Wallace, 57 Ill. 2d 285, 312 N.E.2d 263 (1974) discussed at
pp. 423-24 infra; People v. McCollough, 57 Ill. 2d 440, 313 N.E.2d 462 (1974) dis-
cussed at pp. 421-23 infra.
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
In People v. Nunn,' the Illinois Supreme Court adopted a new
standard concerning the consent of a third person to warrantless
searches and seizures. The defendant was a nineteen year old who
lived in his mother's house, in a bedroom with an adjoining kitchen-
ette. This area had been set apart for his exclusive use. Ten to
fourteen days prior to the search he had left the rooms, locking
them, and telling his mother not to allow anyone to enter. His
mother, concerned about her son's activities within the rooms, gave
the police written consent to search the locked rooms. The police
entered by use of a pass key and seized items which were the basis
of the subsequent indictment.
The circuit court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence and this decision was affirmed in the appellate court.4 The
State based its appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court on that court's
prior decisions which held that a co-occupant, with an equal or
greater right to the use or occupancy of the premises, has the right
to consent to a search of the premises and that any evidence found
therein is admissible against a non-consenting co-occupant.5 This
rule was based on the theory that the consenting co-occupant was
not waiving the rights of the non-consenting co-occupant, but was
only exercising his own rights by consenting to the search.
The supreme court rejected this argument and overruled its pre-
vious 'holdings, 'by affirming the suppression of the items seized.
The court based its decision on the test set down 'by the United States
Supreme Court in Katz v. United States.6 Katz states that "[t]he
Fourth Amendment protects people-not simply 'areas'-against
unreasonable searches and seizures."'7  Building on Katz, the court,
-in a well reasoned opinion, determined that the defendant's fourth
3. 55 Ill. 2d 344, 304 N.E.2d 81(1973).
4. 7 Ill. App. 3d 601, 288 N.E.2d 88 (4th Dist. 1972).
5. See People v. Koshiol, 45 I11. 2d 573, 262 N.E.2d 446 (1970); People v. Has-
kell, 41 Ill. 2d 25, 241 N.E.2d 430 (1968); People v. Palmer, 31 Ill.2d 58, 198
N.E.2d 839 (1964); People v. Palmer, 26 Ill. 2d 464, 187 N.E.2d 236 (1962); People
v. Stacey, 25 I11. 2d 258, 184 N.E.2d 866 (1962); People v. Speice, 23 Ill.2d 40,
177 N.E.2d 233 (1961); People v. Perroni, 14 Ill. 2d 581, 153 N.E.2d 578 (1958);
People v. Shambley, 4 Ill. 2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954).
6. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7. Id. at 353.
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amendment rights were violated since he had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy when -he locked the rooms and ordered his mother
-to allow no one entrance. He had at no time voluntarily waived his
fourth amendment rights; such a waiver is required for a valid con-
sent search. The court here relied on the standard for waiver set
forth in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,8 in which it was 'held that volun-
tariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the relevant
circumstances rather than exclusively from a person's knowledge of
his right to refuse a warrantless search.
: Interestingly enough, the court in Nunn drew no distinctions be-
tween the rights of a tenant, a lodger, a dormitory dweller, or a
minor child living in his parents' home. Conceivably, under the
Nunn doctrine, a minor child with "his" own room could forbid his
parents' entrance thereto and thus cut off their right to consent to
search. This open issue undoubtedly will be presented to the court
for resolution as soon as the proper case arises.
The United States Supreme Court holding in Chimel v. California"
was applied with little or no precision in People v. Williams."0 In
Williams, the defendant was confronted by a mob of about twenty-
five persons in front of his apartment. After phoning the police,
he went outside with a pistol in his pocket. Upon receiving threats
from the crowd, the defendant pulled out the pistol to hold them
at bay. When the police arrived, -the leader of the mob told the
officers that the defendant had assaulted them with a revolver.
The police then went to the apartment and were admitted by the
defendant. The police placed him under arrest. They searched the
defendant's person and a bag of dog food in the kitchen, located be-
tween seven to ten feet away from the defendant. A .22 caliber
pistol was found in the dog food bag. The gun was introduced at
the defendant's trial as evidence of the unlawful use of weapons,
failure -to register firearms with the City of Chicago, and failure to
obtain an owner's registration card.
The supreme court reversed the unlawful use of weapons convic-
tion on the facts, but affirmed the validity of the search of the dog
food 'bag. Based on Chimel, the court held that a warrantless search
8. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
9. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
10. 57 I1. 2d 239, 311 N.E.2d 681 (1974).
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incident to an arrest may be made of the defendant's person plus
the area within his immediate control from which he might obtain
either a weapon or an evidentiary item. 1 The question in the in-
stant case was whether "lunging distance" was to be included within
the area of immediate control. The court cited a number of federal
cases which, because of their factual situations, affirmed searches
beyond the immediate reach of the defendant.' 2
As a result, the court concluded that Chimel only required that
each case be examined individually to determine the reasonableness
of the search and, that under the facts of Williams, lunging area was
within the permissible perimeter of a warrantless search. Thus,
Williams leaves no precise rules in Illinois for the police or defend-
ants to rely upon when a search is conducted in the immediate area
of an arrest.
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS
In People v. Armstrong,'" the defendant was indicted for armed
robbery. Subsequently, he was indicted for the murder of a police
officer during the commission of an earlier armed robbery. The
murder charge was tried first and, prior to that trial, the defendant
moved to suppress as evidence a shotgun and a pistol found in his
apartment. The motion was denied on the ground that the defend-
ant had consented to the search which uncovered the weapons. The
items were received in evidence and the jury found the defendant
guilty of murder. While that judgment was pending on appeal, the
armed robbery case went to trial. A motion to suppress the same
shotgun and pistol was made, the parties stipulating that it be heard
on the same evidence as was heard in the murder trial. The judge
here sustained the motion to suppress and the weapons were not ad-
mitted into evidence in the armed robbery trial. The Illinois Su-
preme Court subsequently affirmed the legality of the search, but
reversed the murder conviction and remanded on other grounds.' 4
11. Id. at 243, 311 N.E.2d at 684.
12. United States v. Wysocki, 457 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Manarite, 448 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Patterson, 447 F.2d 424
(10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Williams, 454 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Appli-
cation of Kiser, 419 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1969). But see United States v. Shy, 473
F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1973).
13. 56 Ill. 2d 159, 306 N.E.2d 14 (1973).
14. 41 Ill. 2d 390, 243 N.E.2d 825 (1969). The case was remanded for improper
testimony of a State's witness concerning a prior statement of a co-defendant.
[Vol. 24:405
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On remand, the murder case came to trial before a third judge
and the defendant again renewed his motion to suppress. No addi-
tional evidence was heard. The judge suppressed the evidence
based on the ruling in the armed robbery case and on section 114-
12 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
The motion shall be in writing and state facts showing wherein the search
and seizure were unlawful. The judge shall receive evidence on any issue
of fact necessary to determine the motion and the burden of proving that
the search and seizure were unlawful shall be on the defendant. If the mo-
tion is granted the property shall be restored, unless otherwise subject to
lawful detention, and it shall not be admissible in evidence against the mov-
ant at any trial; except that, if the order suppressing evidence is nonfinal
according to Section 109-3 of this Act, the property shall not be restored
and shall not because of such order be inadmissible in evidence at any pro-
ceeding other than such preliminary hearing or examination.1 5
The State appealed from that ruling and the order was reversed by
the appellate court.
The supreme court, relying on People v. Hopkins,'6 affirmed the
appellate court, holding that under the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel, the original denial of the motion to suppress barred relitigating
the matter at the armed robbery trial. Only when there is additional
evidence or peculiar circumstances shown at a second trial can the
previously litigated matter be reopened. This being the case, sec-
tion 114-12(b) was precluded from operation in the third trial and
the motion to suppress should have been denied.
The same issue was presented in a different context in People v.
Holland, 7 in which the motion to suppress was both made and re-
jected orally at the preliminary hearing. When the case came to
trial, the defendant, in writing, renewed his motion to suppress.
The trial court held that his motion had been decided at the pre-
liminary hearing, and therefore was not properly before the court.
The supreme court affirmed, but held that had there been additional
evidence presented in support of the written motion, the trial court
would have the ability to hear and grant the motion despite its
rejection at the preliminary hearing.
In ruling on motions to suppress confiscations, the court may have
laid the foundation for admission of confessions obtained in violation
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-12(b) (1973).
16. 52 Ill. 2d 1, 284 N.E.2d 283 (1972).
17. 56 111. 2d 318, 307 N.E.2d 380 (1974).
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of Miranda v. Arizona. 8 In People v. Henenberg,19 the court cor-
rectly suppressed a confession obtained during an interrogation
where despite the defendant's request for the presence of an at-
torney, the questioning continued unabated. What is significant
about this case is that the court refused to decide if a confession ob-
tained in violation of Miranda and admitted into evidence could ever
constitute non-reversible error.' 0 It may be that the court was laying
the groundwork for a future ruling to the effect that Miranda viola-
tions should be viewed as any other trial error, and in the face of
large amounts of uncontroverted evidence of guilt, the admission of
a tainted confession would not require a reversal.
DISCOVERY BY THE DEFENDANT
The issue of discovery of materials in the prosecutor's control
continues to plague the court. In People v. Bassett,2 the court may
have expanded a defendant's resources for the impeachment of
prosecution witnesses. This case grew out of the prison riot which
occurred at Menard Penitentiary in November, 1965. In the course
of the disturbance, three prison guards were killed and the defend-
ants were tried for these murders.
In preparing the case, the state personnel interviewed at least 800
inmates of the penitentiary. Notes, which were not verbatim, were
taken on yellow paper during the interviews. After the interviews
were completed, the notes were transcribed onto white cards, al-
legedly containing a narrative of what the prosecutor, expected to
prove. The defendants contended that they had the. right to use
these white cards for impeachment purposes.
The court first looked to People v. Wolff,22 whose holding is now
incorporated in Supreme Court Rule 412.8 Section (a)(i) of Rule
18. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
19. 55 I11. 2d 5, 302 N.E.2d 27 (1973).
20. Id. at 12, 302 N.E.2d at 30.
21. 56 111. 2d 285, 307 N.E.2d 359 (1974).
22. 19 I11. 2d 318, 167 N.E.2d 197 (1960).
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10A, § 412 '(1973). This rule, and the Wolff decision
are generally based on the reasoning found in Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343
(1959); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); and People v. Moses, 11 I11.
2d 84, 142 N.E.2d 1 (1957).
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412 provides that upon written motion of the defense counsel, the
State shall disclose to the defense counsel
the names and last known addresses of persons whom the State intends to
call as witnesses, together with their relevant written or recorded state-
ments, memoranda containing substantially verbatim reports of their oral
statements, and a list of memoranda reporting or summarizing their oral
statements.
The rule further provides that "memoranda reporting or summariz-
ing oral statements shall be examined by the court in camera and
if found to be substantially verbatim reports or oral statements shall
be disclosed to defense counsel. 24
The State argued that the Wolff decision precluded the defense
from demanding disclosure of the white cards since they were not
verbatim or substantially verbatim reports of the interviews with the
potential witnesses. In rejecting this contention, the court found
that the State had misconstrued the rationale behind the Wolff line
of cases.2 I The court, citing People v. Sumner,26 stated:
[Wlhere the relevancy and competency of a statement or report has been
established, and no privilege exists, the trial court, on appropriate demand,
shall order the statement or report delivered directly to the accused for his
inspection and possible use for impeachment purposes. . . . It was ex-
pressly recognized in Wolff that once a statement is shown to contain per-
tinent material, only the defense should be permitted to determine whether
it may be useful for impeachment. 27
Based upon this holding, a majority of the court concluded that
the white cards should be made available to the defense, especially
since the original notes of the interviews were destroyed by the pros-
ecution. Believing that the cards must contain some type of repro-
duction of what the witnesses had said when interviewed earlier, the
court held that the cards should be turned over -to the trial judge
to have the State's work product deleted and then given to the de-
fense counsel for examination for impeachment purposes.2 8
The dissent by Chief Justice Underwood argued that this decision
went far beyond the holdings of Wolff and its predecessors. By per-
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 412(a)(i) (1973) (emphasis added). See gen-
erally, MacCarthy, Criminal Law, 1971-1972 Survey of Illinois Law, 22 DEPAUL L.
REV. 223, 226-28 (1972).
25. 56 Ill. 2d at 291, 307 N.E.2d at 363.
26. 43 Ill. 2d 228, 252 N.E.2d 534 (1969).
27. 56 Ill. 2d at 291, 307 N.E.2d at 363 (citations omitted).
28. Id. See ILL. Sup. Cr. R. 412(j)(i).
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mitting discovery of non-verbatim notations, the court had ignored
the very essence of impeachment-use of the witness's prior state-
ments, in his own words, to contradict what the witness testifies to on
the stand. In the Chief Justice's view, it would be fundamentally
unfair to impeach a witness with prior statements not shown to be
substantially in the witness's own words. 29  It would have been far
preferable, according to the Chief Justice, if the majority had
grounded its holding solely on the fact that the original notes were
destroyed, rather than extending the scope of criminal discovery
beyond the bounds of substantially verbatim reports.A The dissent
further noted that the majority's holding was merely dicta since the
testimony of the interviewed witnesses was not needed to prove mur-
der on an accountability theory.
Does a defendant ever have the right to the name and address
of a paid informer in a sale of narcotics case? In People v. Lewis,"1
the court held that under certain factual situations, the defendant
is entitled to such information unless the prosecution can establish
that -the health and safety of the informer will be put in jeopardy
by the disclosure.8 2 In Lewis, and the two cases with which it was
consolidated, 3 the sole witnesses to the alleged sale of narcotics were
the purchasing officers and the paid informant. The convictions
were reversed at the appellate level because of the State's failure
to disclose the identity of the informers involved in ,the transac-
tions. 4  The State contended that where there are two witnesses
to -the sale and only the purchasing agent testifies, -the trial judge
should be permitted to approve nondisclosure.3 5
The Illinois Supreme Court, in affirming the appellate court's judg-
ments of -reversal, relied on the United States- Supreme Court's rea-
29. 56 Il1. 2d at 303, 307 N.E.2d at 369.
30. Cf. People v. Norris, 17 Il. App. 3d 23, 308 N.E.2d 30 (1st Dist. 1974).
31. 57 Il. 2d 232, 311 N.E.2d 685 (1974).
32. United States v. Palermo, 410 F.2d 468 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Varelli, 407 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1969); People v. Manzella, 56 Ill.2d 187, 306 N.E.2d
16 (1973).
33. People v. Flippo and People v. Weathers, 57 I1. 2d 232, 311 N.E.2d 685
(1974).
34. People v. Lewis, 12 Ill. App. 3d 762, 301 N.E.2d 469 (3d Dist. 1973); People
v. Flippo, 12 Ill. App. 3d 774, 301 N.E.2d 477 (3d Dist. 1973); People v. Weathers,
12 111. App. 3d 776, 301 N.E.2d 479 (3d Dist. 1973).
35. 57 I11. 2d at 234, 311 N.E.2d at 687.
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soning in Roviaro v. United States. 6 In that case, the Court said:
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The
problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the
flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense.
Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on
the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the
crime charged, the possible defense, the possible significance of the inform-
er's testimony, and other relevant factors.37
Utilizing such an approach the Illinois Supreme Court held that
where there were only three possible witnesses to the alleged sale
and the defendant denied that a sale ever took place, the disclosure
of the informer's name and address was required in order for the
defendant to be able to prepare his defense. Even though the State
may not choose to call the informer to testify, the defendant may
require the informer's testimony. This option cannot be closed by
the unilateral act of the prosecution in not allowing the defendant
to have the informer's true identity, especially where, as here, the
defendants already know the informer by sight and an assumed
name.38  Thus, while there is no definite rule concerning the dis-
closure of the identi.ty of informants, it appears that the fewer the
existing witnesses to the alleged act, the greater the need of the de-
fense to know the informant's identity.
In People v. Schmidt,s9 the defendant was arrested for driving un-
der the influence of alcohol. His pre-trial motion for discovery of
the police arrest report was denied. The trial court refused to admit
the police report into evidence, an order which was reversed and
remanded in the appellate court. 40  The supreme court affirmed the
appellate court judgment, holding that in prosecutions for misde-
meanors, the scope of pre-trial discovery is entirely controlled by
statute. 41  A trial court has no discretion to expand or contract the
scope of items which are discoverable. Thus, with the exception of
36. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
37. Id. at 62.
38. Cf. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412(j) (ii).
39. 56 I11. 2d 572, 309 N.E.2d 557 (1974).
40. 8 I1l. App. 3d 1024, 291 N.E.2d 255 (2d Dist. 1972).
41. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 114-9, -10 (1973); Id. at ch. 95 , §
11-501(g). But see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of evidence
favorable to an accused who has requested it violates due process when evidence is
material to either guilt or punishment).
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witness lists and confessions of -the defendant, 'a misdemeanor arrest
report will only 'be 'available to defendants for use in impeaching the
witness who prepared -the report."2
TRIAL PROBLEMS
Three interesting cases dealing with jurors' requests for testi-
mony, severance, and closing arguments were decided by the Illinois
Supreme Court during the past year. A denial 'by the trial judge
of the jury's request for review of the testimony of the prosecuting
witness -and the arresting officer was held to be within the scope of
the trial court's discretion in People v. Pierce.4 3  The court adopted
the view followed by the majority of jurisdictions. Justice Schaefer
'registered a strong dissent, declaring that the court should have
adopted the American Bar Association Minimum Standards," which,
in effect, declares 'that if the jury's request is reasonable, the trial
judge should, 'after giving notice to the prosecuting and defense at-
torneys, permit the jury to re-examine the requested materials. This
view curtails a court's discretion but leaves the trial judge free to
determine the reasonableness of the jury's request.
A failure of 'the trial court to sever an armed robbery trial from
one for possession of marijuana caused a reversal in People v. Pull-
man.45  The sole connection between the two crimes was that when
defendant was arrested on the marijuana charge he was in possession
of the automobile allegedly stolen in an 'armed robbery sixteen days
earlier. The court based its decision on section 111-4(a) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 46 which provides that two or more
charges may be brought in 'the same indictment or information if
they are based on the same 'act or arose out of the same compre-
-'--2 See People v. Cagle, 41 Ill. 2d 528, 244 N.E.2d 299 (1969).
43. 56 Ill. 2d 361, 308 N.E.2d 577 (1974).,
44. If the jury, after retiring for deliberation, requests a review of certain
testimony or other evidence, they shall be conducted to the courtroom.
Whenever the jury's request is reasonable, the court, after notice to the pros-
ecutor and counsel for the defense, shall have the requested parts of the
testimony read to the jury and shall. permit the jury to reexamine the re-
quested materials admitted into evidence.
ABA ADVISORY COMMIITEE ON -THE CRIMINAL TRIAL, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL
BY JURY, § 5.2(a) (1968).
45. 57 Ill. 2d 15, 309 N.E.2d 565 (1974).
46. ILL. REV, STAT. ch. 38, § 111-4(a) (1973).
[V/ol. 24:405
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hensive transaction. The supreme court held that the mere surface
relationship between the two acts fell far short of what was statutorily
required for a trial joining both counts.
The effect of prejudicial closing arguments by the prosecutors was
the issue before the court in People v. Stock.4 7  There, prosecutors
were found to have (1) gone outside the record, (2) accused the
defense attorneys of concocting the defense case and suborning per-
jury, and (3) commented on the fact that two of the three defendants
did not testify.
After setting forth several eXcerpts'at great length,4" the court
concluded:
47. 56 111. 2d 461, 309 N.E.2d 19 (1974).
48. The opinion sets forth two pages of direct quotes from the transcript to doc-
ument the characterizations. A shortened portion follows:
The prosecutor then proceeded in argument:
.Mr. Elsener: * * * And with a straight face, with a straight face-defense
counsel said, and she worked in a den, in a den. Why do you think they
used words like that? To encourage sympathy for Janet Meyer? or to shift
the light, get it away from the defendants. * * * I'll say it's the most in-
credible defense that this whole court room has ever seen.
Then good old Charles Liphardt, innocent, uninterested Charles Liphardt,
he comes in and he corroborates Dianne. You have to believe Dianne be-
cause of Charles Liphardt. Charles Liphardt can say anything he wants,
because if he doesn't she will go to his wife.
Mr. Toomin: ! O1iject. ......
Mr. Bloom: Object...
.The Court: Mr. State's Attorney, I sustain the objection. Strike the remark
and instruct the jury to disregard it. There is no evidence of that.
Mr. Elsener;. Fine, ladies and gentlemen-
The Court: I must direct you to conduct yourself to the evidence in this
case.
Mr. Elsener, Fine, and the evidence shows he has known her for two years.
The evidence shows -he is married, the evidence shows he goes over and
meets her over at her fried's. The evidence shows that her husband
doesn't know where she is and she doesn't know where her husband is. The
evidence shows that he just drives her around and the evidence shows he
doesn't.testify to some of the most important things in the case until after
he goes to lunch with the good old defense lawyers."
Thus, the prosecution then went on to indirectly accuse the defense lawyers
of suborning perjury:
"Mr. Elsener: What d9 you do when you're caught? What do.you do when
you're guilty? What is the first thing you do if you haven't got anything
else to rely on, you start accusing everybody else, put a finger on them,
them, them, them, and them. Get the light off you, get the heat off you,
keep in the background, sit back there nice and quiet behind your lawyers
and don't do anything.
Mr. Toomin: Object.
Mr. Bloom: Object.
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The repeated disregard of the bounds of proper argument was so flagrant
and purposeful that we can only conclude that it was done for the purpose
of prejudicing the defendants. Such behavior should not be tolerated by the
courts of this State.49
The court also criticized the trial judge for not adequately controlling
the trial, although he did sustain some objections and did admonish
the prosecutors to limit their remarks to the evidence. The court
said that the trial judge had a duty to take further action when re-
peated improprieties occurred. No mention was made of granting
a mistrial, although the opinion by Justice Davis ominously com-
mented that "[c]ounsel's disregard of court rulings and the continu-
ance of such misconduct warrants the imposition of sanctions by the
court." 50
The court's willingness to give close scrutiny to allegations of pros-
ecutorial misconduct in closing arguments is demonstrated by its
decision in People v. Moore."' Accused of murder, Moore relied
upon an alibi defense, testifying that he had gone to his mother's
home and had gone to bed before the murder took place. He
further testified that his mother was not home because she was at
work, and although his father, sister, two nieces, and two nephews
also lived there, he did not know if anyone had seen him enter the
house.5 2 In closing argument, the prosecutor alluded to the fact that
The Court: Sustain the objection.
Mr. Bloom: I ask that he be admonished for that conduct.
The Court: Yet, Mr. Elsener, I will strike the remark and instruct the jury
to disregard it and I do admonish you.
Mr. Magnes: * * * You have the defendants' case. There very briefly you
have the testimony of Dianne Stock. Now, I sat here and listened to the
testimony of Dianne Stock, as well as the rest of it. The defendants got
together and decided to make Dianne Stock their hope and so she picked
herself up off that chair and took the witness stand.
Mr. Toomin: Your Honor, I will object to what the defendants did.
The Court: I will sustain the objection, strike the reference, and I instruct
the jury to disregard it.
Mr. Magnes: She paraded to the witness stand, took a seat, and described
the facts and circumstances of this grand plan, as Mr. Robert Stock and
Mr. Charles Wilfong sat silently by.
Mr. Toomin: I object to that, your Honor.
The Court: I will sustain the objection and strike the reference and instruct
the jury to disregard it."
Id. at 470-71, 309 N.E.2d at 24-25.
49. Id. at 470, 309 N.E.2d at 25.
50. Id. at 473, 309 N.E.2d at 25.
51. 55 Ill. 2d 570, 304 N.E.2d 622 (1973).
52. Id. at 575, 304 N.E.2d at 624,
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the defendant's alibi was uncorroborated because "[e]ven his own
family didn't come in here and under oath say that he was with
them."53
The First Appellate District, Second Division, reversed the lower
court's conviction, holding that since a defendant has no duty to call
witnesses on his behalf, an argument that comments on his failure
to do so is prejudicial. 4 In this opinion, Justice Leighton noted that
the defendant did not inject his relatives into the case because he
did not testify that any of them had, in fact, seen him. Further,
these persons were accessible to the prosecution as witnesses. Such
a state of facts called for a reversal, even though no objection was
made by defense counsel.
The supreme court saw the failure to object by defense counsel
not only as a waiver of any error but as purposeful when seen from
counsel's rebuttal-in which he stated that no one saw the defendant
come home-which "alleviate[d] any possible misleading inference
which may have arisen as a result of the State's comment. '55 Fin-
ally, in light of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant,
the court concluded that the statement was not a significant factor
in the jury's determination.
It is interesting to note that the weight of the evidence played no
role in the reversal of the conviction by the court in Stock, where
the prosecutors' misdeeds were numerous and repeated. However,
the weight of the evidence did become a factor in Moore where the
comment was isolated from a long summation.
Obviously, not every improper remark by the prosecutor in his
closing argument will result in the reversal of conviction. In People
v. Skorusa,56 the prosecutor felt compelled to tell the jury "that if
we in conscience didn't know for a fact that the defendant, Stanley
Skorusa, shot and killed Irene Kowalkowski, you ladies and gentle-
men wouldn't be sitting here in judgment of him."' 57 While labeling
this remark an improper expression of personal opinion, the court
53. Id. at 576, 304 N.E.2d at 625.
54. People v. Moore, 9 Ill. App. 3d 231, 292 N.E.2d 42 (1st Dist. 1972).
55. 55 Ill. 2d at 577, 304 N.E.2d at 625.
56. 55 Ill. 2d 577, 304 N.E.2d 630 (1973).
57. id. at 585, 304 N.E.2d at 634.
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found it to be harmless error ,because of the overwhelming evidence
of defendant's guilt. 8
Another allegedly erroneous prejudicial comment by the prosecu-
tor in Skorusa was found to be proper. The prosecutor stated, "We
have heard no evidence here from the stand of what the reason, from
his side, for this death was."59  The court found this statement to
be a permissible reference to the uncontradicted nature of the State's
case rather than an attempt to focus the jury's attention on the de-
fendant's failure to testify. Thus, the principle remains intact that
a prosecutor may allude to the uncontradicted nature of the evidence
supporting the State's case although the only person who could offer
contradiction is the defendant. 60
SENTENCINCG-POST CONVICTION REMEDIES
In People v. Mahle,6' the defendant was convicted of deceptive
practices and sentenced to five years probation, upon condition that
the first year of the probationary period be served at the State Penal
Farm, located -in Vandalia. This sentence was approved by the
appellate court. 2 Defendant contended successfully that this condi-
tion on his probation was improper under the Unified Code of Cor-
rections. 63 The parole provisions of the Unified Code of Correc-
tions64 were held to apply to prisoners sentenced prior to its adop-
tion. In People ex rel. Weaver v. Longo, 5 the court held that the
legislature intended these provisions to apply retroactively because
of its desire to show clemency to those incarcerated.66 Citing Longo,
the supreme court upheld the defendant's contentions and reversed
the sentence. 7
58. Id.
59. Id. at 584, 304 N.E.2d at 634.
60. The court cited with approval this statement of the law from People v. Mills,
40 Ill. 2d 4, 8, 237 N.E.2d 697, 700 (1968).
61. 57 Ill. 2d 279, 312 N.F2d 267 (1974).
62. People v. Mahle, 9 Ill. App. 3d 166, 292 N.E.2d 119 (3d Dist. 1972).
63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3(d) (1973).
64. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1001-1-1 et seq. (1973).
65. 57 Ill. 2d 67, 309 N.E.2d 581 (1974).
66. The legislature's authority to act in this manner was affirmed in People ex
rel. Kubala v. Kinney, 25 Il. 2d 491, 185 N.E.2d 337 (1962).
67. 57 Il. 2d at 284, 312 N.E.2d at 270.
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In People v. Sarelli,68 the defendant's petition for post-conviction
relief was denied by the circuit court. He appealed to the supreme
court alleging, inter alia, that the statute under which he was con-
victed was unconstitutional." This issue was raised neither at trial,
nor on appeal to the appellate court.70  The supreme court had prev-
iously held the statute unconstitutional; 71 however, this was after the
defendant's post-conviction petition had been denied in circuit court.
In Sarelli, the supreme court, out of consideration for justice and
fairness, held that the issue of unconstitutionality could be raised for
the first time on appeal.
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
This past year the court found one occasion to criticize the manner
in which a brief was prepared. In People v. Peter,72 defense counsel
was criticized for exceeding the seventy-five page limit and for using
a shotgun approach. The court stated:
We do not feel, however, that it is necessary to make an appellant's brief a
catalogue of every conceivable error. . . . A more selective presentation
involving substantial rights or matters prejudicial to the defendant would
more precisely define the issues. 73
In People ex rel. Millet v. Woods, 4 a habeas corpus proceeding,
the petitioner had exhausted his appellate options in 1965. On
November 24, 1965, the supreme court issued its mandate to the
appellate court to that effect. However, it was not until August 19,
1970, that the appellate court's mandate of affirmance was made
part of the record in the circuit court. During all this time petitioner
was free on bond pending appeal. The circuit court issued a writ
of 'habeas corpus, discharging petitioner from custody. The su-
preme court affirmed, holding that where petitioner had been lead-
ing a lawful and productive life in the years subsequent to his convic-
tion, the five year period between mandate and sentencing was an
68. 55 Ill. 2d 169, 302 N.E.2d 317 (1973).
69. Narcotic Drug Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 22-1 et seq. (1969).
70. People v. Sarelli, 105 Ill. App. 2d 167, 245 N.E.2d 49 (1st Dist. 1969).
71. People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971).
72. 55 Ill. 2d 443, 303 N.E.2d 398 (1973).
73. Id. at 447, 303 N.E.2d at 401.
74. 55 Ill. 2d 1, 302 N.E.2d 32 (1973).
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unreasonable delay, especially since the delay was in no manner at-
tributable to petitioner.
FAIR TRIAL AND THE ATTORNEY
The resolution of two problems that often face defense lawyers
was considered and commented upon by the supreme court in
People v. McCalvin.5 Not only did the defendants reject their law-
yers' advice to plead guilty, but one of them, against his lawyer's
advice and in the face of overwhelming evidence, also elected to
take the witness stand.
On appeal defendants asserted that they were deprived of a fair
trial because the attorneys told the court, outside the presence of
the jury, that the defendants had rejected the advice of counsel on
both of the above matters. The defendants characterized these mat-
ters as a conflict of interest between the lawyer and his clients.
The court found that the attorney's concern that a complete record
be made was understandable, and ultimately concluded that no con-
flict existed and that defendants were not deprived of a fair trial.
Acknowledging that it is desirable that a record be made of a signifi-
cant disagreement between a lawyer and his client, the court voiced
its approval of the American Bar Association Standards relating to
the Defense Functions, and the commentary to the Standard which
calls for "a notation of the nature of the disagreement, the advice
given, and the action taken, either in the lawyer's file or by letter
to the client, depending upon the gravity of the problem."76
It is interesting to note that while the defendants alleged a conflict
of interest, and the court mentioned protection against a post-convic-
tion charge of incompetence, the major reason motivating the de-
fense attorneys was probably the fear of a future allegation of subor-
nation of perjury. What is sand to the court may be quicksand to
the practitioner.
SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The single case in which the constitutionality of a criminal statute
75. 55 Ill. 2d 161, 302 N.E.2d 342 (1973).
76. ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION, COMMENTARY OF THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, § 5.2(c) at 241 (Tent. Draft
Mar. 1970).
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came under serious attack resulted in the statute being upheld by
a four to three decision. From the authors' perspective, the majority
opinion was inexplicable, -the dissenting opinion being far more per-
suasive. In People v. McCollough,"7 the defendant was charged in
a two count indictment with involuntary manslaughter and reckless
homicide. Both counts charged violation of section 9-3 of the Crim-
inal Code which reads:
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits
involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause
the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to
some individual and he performs them recklessly.
(b) If the acts which cause the death consist of the driving of a motor ve-
hicle, the person may be prosecuted for reckless homicide or if he is pros-
ecuted for involuntary manslaughter, he may be found guilty of the included
offense of reckless homicide.
(c) Penalty
(1) A person convicted of involuntary manslaughter shall be im-
prisoned in the penitentiary from one to 10 years.
(2) A person convicted of reckless homicide shall be fined not to ex-
ceed $1,000 or imprisoned in a penal institution other than the
penitentiary not to exceed one year, or in the penitentiary from
one to five years, or both fined and imprisoned.78
Each count was framed in identical language, charging that de-
fendant did
recklessly and with willful and wanton disregard for the safety of * * * a
five year old child, increase the speed of the motor vehicle he was driving
* * * and failed to exercise due caution to avoid colliding with said child
upon the roadway * * * and did * * * kill [the child] without lawful jus-
tification in violation of the Criminal Code. . . .79
After a bench trial, the defendant was found not guilty of involuntary
manslaughter but guilty of reckless homicide and sentenced to six
months probation."0 The Fourth District Appellate Court reversed
the conviction holding section 9-3(b) unconstitutional.8 The State
took an appeal to the supreme court as a matter of right.82
Defendant argued that since the two offenses, one a felony and
the other a misdemeanor, contained exactly the same elements, he
77. 57 Ill. 2d 440, 313 N.E.2d 462 (1974).
78. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-3 (1973).
79. 57 Ill. 2d at 441, 313 N.E.2d at 462-63.
80. Id. at 441, 313 N.E.2d at 463.
81. People v. McCollough, 8 Il1. App. 3d 963, 291 N.E.2d 505 (4th Dist. 1972).
82. See ILL. Sup. Cr. R. 317.
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was deprived of due process and equal protection of the law.
Further, as was stated by the appellate court, the statute
places within the uncontrolled and unguided discretion of the State's At-
torney, the Grand Jury, and in some instances the trial judge or petit jury,
the power to impose different degrees of punishment for different persons
who commit identical acts under identical circumstances. 8 3
The supreme court reversed the appellate court and held the stat-
ute constitutional. The majority based its opinion on two fators-
interpretation of prior case law in the state and the rationale be hind
the passage of the original reckless homicide statute in 1949. s,
In upholding the validity of the section, the majority relied on
People v. Garman, 5 People v. Rhodes,86 and People v. Keegan.s7
Garman had upheld the reckless homicide statute, holding that the
same set of facts may constitute separate offenses under different
statutes."' Rhodes held that where the acts of an accused constitute
more than one offense, it is within the discretion of the state's at-
torney to evaluate the evidence and decide which offense or offenses
can and should be charged . 9  Keegan held that charges could be
brought for both the felony of indecent liberties with a child"° and
the misdemeanor of contributing to the sexual delinquency of a
child"' ,based on precisely the same conduct. 2
What the majority overlooked in citing these cases, according to
Justice Ryan's well reasoned dissent, was that in each instance the
crimes charged either contained different elements or, as in Keegan,
provided for different affirmative defenses.93  This is a crucial dis-
tinction for it provides a legal consistency between a guilty verdict
on one charge and an acquittal on the other. In McCollough, where
the elements of the crimes charged were identical, that consistency
83. 8 I11. App. 3d at 971, 291 N.E.2d at 511.
84. Laws of 1949, p. 716; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 364a (1949).
85. 411 Ill. 279, 103 N.E.2d 636 (1952).
86. 38 Ill. 2d 389, 231 N.E.2d 400 (1967).
87. 52 Il. 2d 147, 286 N.E.2d 345 (1971).
88: 411 ]l.af 285, 103 N.E.2d at 639.
89. 38 Il1. 2d at 396, 231 N.E.2d at 403.
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-4 (1973).
91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-5 (1973).
92. 52 I11. 2d at 153, 286 N.E.2d at 348.
93. 57 Ill. 2d at 446-47, 313 N.E,2d at 465-66,
is lacking in the different judgments-either the elements were
present or they were not.
The second factor which the majority relied on was the legislators'
intent in enacting the reckless homicide statute. The court stated:
-The General Assembly may well have established the new offense of reck-
less homicide in 1949 because it determined that in many cases judges. and
juries were reluctant to convict a defendant of involuntary manslaughter
when the reckless conduct that caused death consisted of the driving of a
motor vehicle. And it may also have decided that because of the many po-
tential shadings of reckless automobile driving, ranging from that which
borders upon willfulness to that which borders upon negligence, the offense
of manslaughter, with its more severe penalties, should be retained for the
more serious offenses. Such determinations are not unreasonable, in our
Opinion, and their expression in the statute deprives no one of due process
or equal protection of the laws. 94
-he dissent, which was joined by Justices Ward and Goldenhersh,
did not challenge the rationale behind the statute, but rather found
fault with the majority's conclusion. It cited authority from a num-
ber of other jurisdictions which considered this issue.' 5 In each in-
stance the'courts have held that where one cannot ascertain under
what circumstances he may ,be guilty of a felony and under what
circumstances he may'be- guilty of a misdemeanor only, equal protec-
tion principles are offended. 6
McCollough presents an example of a defendant's inability to
ascertain whether his acts were punishable as a felony or a mis-
demeanor. It is exactly this type of uncertainty that 'a criminal code
is intended to eliminate.9 7  The decision here is a giant step away
fromthat goal. .
BRIBERY ISSUES
In. the substantive -area, -the court also accepted for review two
cases in which it was necessary to interpret overlapping statutes.
The decisionsare confusing at best and poorly-reasoned at worst.
In one, People v. Wallace,98 a bribe offer was rejected and the
94. Id. at 445, 313 N.E.2d at 465. -
95. State v. Pirkey, 203 Ore. 697, 281 P.2d 698 (1955); State v. Twitchell, 8
Utfah-2d-4,-333-P.2d'1075-(1959; Olsen v. Delmore, 48 Wash. 2d 545, 295 P.2d
324 (1956).
96. See also Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C.C.A. 1972).
97. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-3 (1973).
98. 57 Ill.2d 285, 312 N.E.2d 263 (1974).
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defendants were charged with attempted bribery. Appellants con-
tended that since their acts constituted bribery under the statute,
they could not be convicted for attempt. The court held, that in
the absence of manifest legislative intent to exclude bribery from
the general attempt provisions of the Criminal Code,99 one may be
convicted of attempted bribery even if the act has been consum-
mated according to the statutes. This is true because no actual pas-
sage of property is required to complete the offense.
Although the offer of a bribe falls within the statute defining
bribery itself, the use of the attempt statute rather than the substan-
tive statute alone does not create a legally inconsistent posture, but
rather a logically inconsistent one. Although the court hypothesized
a situation, "in which the conduct of a defendant does not amount to
the unlawful tender or promise of property to a public official under
the bribery section (par. 33-1) yet such activity might be construed
as a substantial step toward the completion of the offense,"' 00 it is
difficult to conjure one up. The instant fact situation was certainly
not one in which the prosecutor was well-advised to charge under the
generalized attempt statute.
In People v. Gokey,' 0' the defendant was arrested by a police of-
ficer of his acquaintance for reckless driving. While entering the
police car, a pistol dropped through his pants leg to the ground at
his feet. He was then charged with unlawful use of weapons and
'brought to the police station. The following scenerio occurred at
the station house:
Sergeant Matt Schalz testified that when the defendant was brought into the
police station, he said, "Matt, you are not going to let them put me in jail,
are you?" Schalz replied, "Sorry, Tom, I can't help you." Gokey then
said, "I will give you 50 bucks-just don't lock me up." Schalz said, "I
can't do you any good; come on, let's go." The officers then took Gokey
downstairs to a squad room and there Gokey said, "Well, if $50.00 isn't
enough, how about $500.00?" When Sergeant Schalz answered, "I don't
want your money, Tom, I can't do anything for you.", Gokey then said,
"How about $5,000.00?" When Stalz ignored this, the defendant said,
"Here, take the whole goddamn thing." and he threw a roll of money on
the table. There was $7,200 in the roll.' 02
99. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-4 (1973).
100. 57 II. 2d at 292, 312 N.E.2d at 267.
101. 57 I11. 2d 433, 312 N.E.2d 637 (1974).
102, Id. at 435, 312 NE.2d at 638.
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For this, the defendant was charged and convicted of bribery.
The supreme court, analogizing the "bribe" to those extravagant
contract offers which are not intended to be taken seriously, reversed
the conviction holding that the intent was obviously not present des-
pite defendant's words and actions.
While this case may be of little substantive significance, it is nice
to note that the Supreme Court of Illinois has retained its perspec-
tive and sense of humor while maintaining its essential concern with
fairness.
